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Introduction 
Oman emerged from political isolation and economic backwardness on the accession of 
sultan Qaboos bin Said in July 1970. Oil had been discovered in commercial quantities 
in the interior of the country in 1964 and went into production in 1967. The first action 
of the new sultan was to orient the economy toward rapid economic growth and modern-
ization. 
Industry was non-existent in Oman before 1970. From the start, it was the policy of the 
government that industry should be directed toward exploiting the natural resources of 
the country to minimize the import of manufactured goods. In the beginning, develop-
ment was necessarily slow due to the lack of basic infrastructure and of a skilled or semi-
skilled workforce. In recent years, however, industry has expanded at a rapid pace. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess Oman's experience of industrial diversification. 
What gains have been made to date? What have been the critical factors responsible for 
the country's progress? What particular problems has the country encountered in its at-
tempts to increase industrial output? Will these problems exist in the future, and if so to 
what extent? What strategies might the government adopt to overcome likely im-
pediments to industrial growth? 
Recent developments 
In 1980 as the result of increased oil output and the bringing on stream of new fields in 
the southern province of Dhofar, Oman's oil share increased to 69 percent of GDP from 
a level of 54 percent in 1972. By 1982, however, it had fallen back to slightly under 54 
percent as a result of lower production and increases in other sectors; it has been less 
than 50 percent since 1983 (Tubles I and 2). In 1985, mining and quarrying (including 
natural gas) contributed around 48 percent of GDP, but this proportion fell sharply to 
slightly over 35 percent in 1986 due to the oil price collapse. 
The sharp decline in oil prices beginning in late 1985 was met by the government with 
an immediate 10.2 percent devaluation of the riyal in January 1986. But as crude prices 
fell even further, the burden on the economy continued to grow as a result of which a 
plan was introduced in February 1986 to cut government spending and adjust the budget. 
Ultimately, the country ran into a budget deficit of about $1.8 billion, more than three 
times the targeted level. 
Although oil revenues have fallen off in recent years, a relative advantage enjoyed by 
the Sultanate is that it is not a member of OPEC and therefore not obliged to adhere to 
the cartel's production policies. As a result, the country increased its oil production 
levels to partially compensate for the decline in prices. 
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Table 1: Oman: Gross Domestic Product by sector (OR million, current prices) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 
Agriculture 40.5 45,7 53.4 57.l 67.5 63.8 77.8 
Fishing 21.6 20.4 27.l 31.9 28.3 25.5 45.8 
Crude Oil 1,456. l 1,402.0 1,353.3 1,408.7 1,609.3 949. 1,143.7 
Natural Gas 17.7 18.9 25.8 33.6 36.0 38.5 44.4 
Other mining 2.6 3.8 5.5 7.2 8.8 9.3 14.0 
Manufacturing 27.0 39.6 67.1 91.2 112.l 178.3 122.7 
Electricity 13.9 15.9 16.5 25.2 27.1 29.7 28.4 
Water 4.8 5.4 7.5 7.5 9.7 10.6 17.8 
Construction 144.9 169.8 187.4 226.9 242.2 220.8 119.4 
Trade 251.3 299.5 315.7 369.0 428.0 383.2 388.8 
Transport 42.0 49.6 53.3 60.2 68.2 68.7 71.6 
Communications 11.8 15.3 19.6 24.3 31.4 33.5 36.7 
Banking 44.7 51.8 56.4 66.3 72.9 78.5 77.0 
Insurance 4.3 10.0 7.2 12.2 17.0 20.l 11.5 
Dwellings 130.8 137.3 152.4 154.1 159.4 143.8 155.7 
Business services 28.6 32.1 34.l 43.3 45.6 43.9 25.2 
Personal services 16.9 20.7 25.4 31.6 36.0 38.5 45.7 
Admin I defense 206.1 234.5 280.9 332.9 373.0 382.8 399.2 
Other government services 54.4 70.5 79.1 91.0 104.9 113.0 136.0 
Charges and duties -27.7 -29.2 -27.9 -27.5 -22.5 -34.2 -78.8 
Gross Domestic Product 2,490.5 2,613.6 2,739.0 3,046.7 3,455.9 2,797.9 2,912.3 
Source: Development Council, Statistical Yearbook 
Table 2: Oman: Gross Demestic Product by sector (percent of GDP) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 
Agriculture 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.7 
Fishing 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.6 
Crude Oil 58.5 53.6 49.4 46.2 46.6 33.9 39.3 
Natural Gas 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 
Other mining ins ins ins ins ins ins 0.5 
Manufacturing 1.1 1.5 2.4 3.0 3.2 6.4 4.2 
Electricity 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.0 
Water 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Construction 5.8 6.5 6.8 7.4 7.0 7.9 4.1 
Trade 10.9 11.5 11.5 12.1 12.4 13.7 13.4 
Transport 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 
Communications 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 
Banking 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.8 2.6 
Insurance 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 
Dwellings 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.1 4.6 5.1 5.3 
Business services 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.6 0.9 
Personal services 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.6 
Admin/ defense 8.3 5.0 10.3 10.9 10.8 13.7 13.7 
Other government services 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 
Source: Development Council, Statistical Yearbook 
Through the 1980s, there have been considerable increases in the wholesale and retail 
trade sector and in transport and communications. In the agricultural sector, however, 
increases in output had, until 1986, been below the overall increase in GDP, with the 
result of a falling share of that sector in total output. The decline of agriculture has fairly 
serious implications given the fact that the sector provides employment to a high propor-
tion of the workforce. In 1986, manufacturing accounted for 6.4 percent of GDP, a sharp 
increase from 3.2 percent the year before. 
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Overall, the country has been able to sustain very high rates of growth, averaging 
slightly under 15 percent per annum in real terms over the 1982-84 period (Table 3). 
Growth has however fallen off sharply in the last several years, averaging slightly under 
3 percent per annum. 
Table 3: Oman: Recent economic trends, 1982-1987 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
GDP at current prices 
(OR million) 2,613.6 2,739.0 3,046.7 3,455.9 2,800.4 3,002.6 2,91 
GDP at constant 1978 
prices (OR million) 1,367.1 1,585.3 1,850.6 2,105.2 2,165.2 2,095.4 2,21 
% real change 11.5 16.7 16.7 13.7 2.9 -3. 5.7 
Source: Development Council, Statistical Yearbook 
During the country's Second Five Year Plan Period (1981-85), a large number of in-
frastructure projects were either started or completed. The ones started will be com-
pleted during the Third Plan which will have a growth rate target of 4 percent. 
On the demand side, the country has been able to sustain high rates of investment 
(Table 4), with rates averaging a very respectable Z7.8 percent of GDP over the 1981-86 
period. Private consumption increased sharply during this period - from 23.7 percent 
of GDP in 1981 to 38.2 percent in 1986. Both these trends have taken place in an environ-
ment of relatively constant government consumption, and a deteriorating balance of 
payments - both investment and private consumption have expanded their share in 
GDP during a period of falling exports and rising imports. 
Table 4: Oman: Gross Domestic Product by expenditure (OR million at current prices) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 
Private Consumption 590.6 794.7 802.2 938.5 1,171.7 1,020.0 1,179.7 
Government Consumption 656.4 715.2 779.8 808.0 894.1 929.0 956.0 
Investment 583.5 706.7 736.9 913.2 953.1 898.4 490.6 
Net Export of goods 
and services 660.0 397.0 421.0 387.0 437.0 -47.0 293.0 
GDP 2,490.5 2,613.6 2,739.9 3.046.7 3,455.9 2,800.4 2,919.3 
{percent of GDP) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 
Private Consumption 23.7 30.4 29.3 30.85 33.9 38.2 40.4 
Government Consumption 26.4 27.4 28.5 26.5 25.9 30.5 32.7 
Investment 23.4 27.0 26.9 30.0 27.6 32.1 16.8 
Net Exports of goods 
and services 26.5 15.2 15.4 12.7 12.6 -1.l 10.0 
Source: Development Council, Statistical Yearbook 
Falling oil revenues have already affected implementation of the Third Development 
Plan covering 1986-90, which was cautiously based on an assumed oil price of $20-$24 
per barrel at a time when the price was actually higher at $Z7 per barrel. The subsequent 
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price declines have threatened to invalidate the plan. However, the government has 
asserted that it has no intention of abandoning the plan and it is therefore likely that the 
plan will be only partially successful. 
In fact, the country's small financial reserves, limited overseas investments, rapidly 
rising recurrent expenditures, and sizeable production costs (5$/barrel) for its oil have 
made the post-1986 period a financially difficult one for the country. Total revenues in 
1986 were only ORl,221 million but in 1987 (Table 5) some of the lost ground was 
recovered and total revenues rose by 20.3 percent to ORl,468 million (of which 81 per-
cent was from oil). 
Table 5: Oman: Main components of government revenue and expenditure (OR million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1990 
Available Resources 
Oil Revenue 1,215.7 1,277.5 1,304.6 1,510.0 1,107.1 1,046.2 
Other Revenue 118.1 146.3 208.6 266.2 234.9 269.8 
Total Revenue 1,333.8 1,423.8 1,513.2 1,776.2 1,342.0 1,316.0 
Expenditures 
Defense 581.3 670.7 728.2 749.9 528.0 501.5 
Civilian Exp 
Civil Min 315.7 362.7 409.4 489.0 507.0 517.0 
Operational 55.7 58.7 58.5 62.9 68.4 77.3 
Interest on Loans 17.5 19.2 . 39.3 47.1 94.0 100.0 
Total Civilian Recurrent 388.9 440.6 507.2 599.0 669.4 694.3 
Total Develop 395.2 377.1 464.7 533.7 345.6 333.2 
Source: Directorate General of National Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 
In terms of expenditures, the cost of supporting the country's military and security 
forces more than trebled between 1978 and 1985, after a decline during the previous 
years which had resulted from the ending of unrest in Dhofar. Actual defense expend-
iture up until 1985 was often higher than planned, a result of the sultan's plans to increase 
further military facilities in the Musandam peninsula, which borders the Strait of 
Hormuz. 
Civilian expenditure rose quickly from OR383.7 million in 1980 to OR922.1 million 
in 1985. Together with rising defense expenditure, this led to the first deficit of OR23.4 
million (after borrowing) in 1982. Increased borrowing was necessary, but the 1985 
deficit still rose to OR87.5 million. This led the government for the first time to call on 
its reserves in the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF). In 1986, a withdrawal of 
OR492.4 million was needed to cover that year's deficit. In 1987, the actual government 
deficit (before borrowing) was reduced by more than had been expected. 
Expenditure fell from ORl,887 million to ORl,551 million (by 17.8 percent) mainly 
due to the reduction in development and military expenditure. Development expenditure 
in 1987, excluding the government's share in development investment and gas explora-
tion, was OSR229.1 million, the lowest figure since 1980. The 1987 deficit, after bor-
rowing, was OR118.6 million and the withdrawal from the SGRF, was OR88.l million (18 
percent of the 1986 level). • · 
Although Oman contributes to several aid funds abroad, the country itself has been 
a large recipient of loans and aid from the Arab world and from European lenders. In 
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addition, the country has a high external debt by GCC standards (Table 6). In 1979 it tap-
ped the international commercial market for a $150 million euroloan to finance the 
development of the oil fields in Dhofar. A $300 million euroloan was raised in 1983 to 
finance development and was heavily oversubscribed, reflecting the country's excellent 
credit rating at that time. However, a $500 million euroloan in 1986 was raised with 
rather more difficulty, reflecting Oman's weaker financial position after the oil price 
collapse. No further loans were taken out in 1987, but it is becoming increasingly likely 
that Oman will be forced to raise further loans. 
Table 6: Oman: Public external debt ($ million) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 
Total 921.3 1,384.7 1,489.0 1,633.0 2,330.0 2,959.0 2,940.0 
Disbursed 537.2 724.0 1,131.7 1,340.0 1,908.0 2,463.0 2,488.0 
official creditors 374.1 360.8 344.9 351.0 385.0 404.0 338.0 
multilateral 46.5 43.5 44.6 67.0 98.0 126.0 142.0 
bilateral 327.7 317.3 300.2 284.7 287.0 278.0 195.0 
private creditors 163.0 363.l 786.9 988.4 1,524.0 2,060.0 2,151.0 
Debt Service 119.2 117.5 166.0 244.0 289.0 422.0 570.0 
principal 84.4 84.0 83.0 129.0 147.0 225.0 348.0 
interest 34.8 33.5 83.0 ll5.0 142.0 197.0 222.0 
Source: World Banlc, World Debt Tables 
To get an idea of the manner in which the Omani economy has evolved since the 1973 I 74 
oil price increases, together with a picture of the critical areas in which the economy dif-
fers from that of its neighbors, a factor analysis of several of the major economic structural 
characteristics of the Arab countries was undertaken. The main features examined were: 
(a) defense expenditures, (b) government non-defense expenditures, (c) imports, (d) 
economic size (defined here as the percent of each country's Arab world population times 
its share of GDP), and (e) the amount of output devoted to distribution, an activity of 
relatively great importance in the Arab Gulf states. 
Based on the discussion above, and as an initial hypothesis, it was assumed that the 
UAE differed from other Arabian Gulf countries in that it has: (a) due to the late start of 
its industrialization, a smaller share of output accounted for by manufacturing in the years 
immediately following the oil price increases; (b) as a result of limited non-oil resources, 
a larger share ofoil relative to total economic activity; (c) as a corollary to (a and b) above, 
a relatively large share of imports in total expenditures; (d) a fairly high correlation be-
tween government expenditures (both military and non-military) and oil revenues. 
To avoid as much as possible arbitrarily defining the variables used in the analysis, each 
structural feature (except military expenditures) was represented by two measures: (a) its 
share ofnon-oil GDP, and (b) its share of absorption (total consumption plus investment). 
Military expenditures were depicted by the share of budgetary allocations to defense, and 
the ratio of military expenditures to non-oil GDP. 1 Based on Eigen values, 2 a four factor 
analysis was considered optimal. 
1 Data are for the twenty member countries of the Arab Monetary Fund, and was taken from: Arab Monetary Fund National 
Account Estimates, 1974-1985 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
2 For an excellent discussion of the use of Eigen values in selecting fuctors, see: R.J. Rununel, Applied Factor Analysis 
(Evanston, lliinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 
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Structural change over time was observed by spreading the factor analysis over five 
year intervals for the 1975-85 period. The data sample was taken from the Arab 
Monetary Fund3 and included the twenty Arab members of the Fund. 
As it turned out, the variables defined as shares of non-oil GDP and absorption are 
correlated closely enough so that each of the factors represented one of the four main 
structural features. The correlation of a fifth structural dimension, the share of 
distributive trade in non-oil GDP and absorption, therefore, provides an indication of 
the degree of association between it and the main structural dimensions of the Arab 
countries. 
The resulting factor scores for each sector, therefore, represent the relative4 ranking 
of each of the twenty countries in terms of the development of each sector. More 
specifically, the factor scores are scaled so that the country with the highest positive fac-
tor score on a particular sector possesses the largest share (relative to the other nineteen 
countries) of that sector in its economy. Similarly, the country with the lowest (negative) 
factor score has the smallest share of that sector in its economy. The rest of the countries 
will rank between. 
Table 7: Arab world: Structural patterns, 1'175 (standardized regression coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Oil/Civil Imports Military Distribution 
Expenditure Expenditures 
Variable Structural Dimension 
gov civil exp/absor 0.96* -0.16 -1.15 0.08 
gov civil exp/ gdp 0.95* -0.01 0.02 -0.05 
oil/absor 0.94* 0.00 -0.02 0,07 
oillgdp 0.84* 0.13 0.13 -0.02 
imports/ gdp 0.00 0.94* 0.15 0.01 
imports/ absor -0.04 0.86* -0.15 0.15 
size O.Q3 -0.63* 0.62* 0.10 
mil exp/gov exp -0.17 -0.12 1.01* 0.08 
mil exp/gdp 0.30 0.21 0.74* -0.18 
distribut/ absor 0.06 -0.07 -0.17 0.91* 
distribut/ gdp 0.01 0.26 0.19 0.87* 
(factor scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Oil/Civil Imports Military Distribution 
Expenditure Expenditures 
GCC States Structural Dimension 
UAE 0.11 0.53 -0.37 1.68 
Bahrain -0.24 2.12 0.79" 1.07 
Saudi Arabia 2.05 0.06 1.41 -0.98 
Oman 0.90 1.92 2.34 -0.80 
Qatar 2.53 -0.38 -1.00 1.79 
Kuwait na na na na 
Notes: Four factor analysis, oblique rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Income Accounts of 
the Arab Countries (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, 1978). gdp = non-oil Gross Domestic Product; 
absor = absorption (total consumption plus investment) 
3 Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
4 Only the results for the Gulf countries are reported here. 
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7/Jble 8: Arab world: Structural patterns, 1980 (standardized regression coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor4 
Oil/ gov Imports Military Size 
civil exp Distribut Expenditures 
Variable Structural Dimension 
oil/absorption 1.05* 0.05 -0.11 -0.21 
oil/gdp 0.99* -0.01 0.05 -0.17 
gov civ exp/absor 0.68* 0.03 -0.15 0.52 
gov civ exp/gdp 0.63* -0.05 0.06 0.53 
imports/absor -0.03 0.92* -0.01 0.04 
distribut/absor -0.06 0.92* -0.31 O.oI 
distribut/ gdp 0.10 0.76* 0.27 -0.03 
imports/gdp 0.09 0.68* 0.37 0.01 
mil exp/gov exp -0.14 0.00 -1.01 * -0.19 
mil exp/gdp 0.30 -0.05 0.69* 0.34 
size -0.21 0.03 -0.06 0.96* 
(factor scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Oil/gov Imports Military Size 
civil exp Distribut Expenditures 
GCC States Structural Dimension 
UAE 0.53 1.15 0.99 -1.32 
Bahrain -0.35 2.74 -0.60 -0.53 
Saudi Arabia 0.88 -0.45 0.73 1.80 
Oman 0.68 0.68 2.40 -0.51 
Qatar 1.89 0.47 -0.41 -0.05 
Kuwait 1.18 0.64 -0.69 -0.42 
Notes: Four factor analysis, oblique rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Income Accounts of 
the Arab Countries (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, 1978). gdp = non-oil Gross Domestic Product; 
absor = absorption (total consumption plus investment) 
Several interesting trends (Tables 7, 8 and 9) were identified. In particular, at the begin-
ning of the period in 1975 (Table 7): (1). The highest correlation between structural 
dimensions was that of oil and government civilian (non-military) expenditures. In other 
words, the initial impact of the oil price/revenue increase resulted in expanded govern-
ment expenditure for social and economic activities. (2) The distribution sector's 
development appears to have occurred independently of the other structural dimensions 
examined here. In Oman's case there appears to be (relative to the other GCC countries) 
considerable underdevelopment of this kind of economic activity. (3) Most likely due to 
lack of industrial development, Oman ranked second (after Bahrain) in terms of import 
dependence. (4) Even before the country's oil discoveries had a chance to significantly 
alter the pattern of government expenditure, Oman had by far the highest share of 
resources allocated to defense. 
By the near peak of the oil boom, 1980 (Thble 8): (1) Oil sector and government 
civilian expenditure remained the two most highly correlated structural dimensions. 
Oman's relatively low factor score (0.53) on this dimension simply reflects the fact that 
the country is not as well endowed with oil reserves as several of its neighbors. (2) Prob-
ably more importantly, the very large (Factor 3) allocation to defense most likely cut 
heavily into revenues that normally would have been allocated for civilian uses. (3) Due 
largely to its late start in development, the country had one of the lower economic sizes 
in the GCC (Factor 4). 
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Table 9: Arab world: Structural patterns, 1985 (standardiud regression coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Oil/Mil Government Imports Distribution 
Expenditure Civil/Exp 
Variable Sectoral Dimension 
mil exp/gov exp 1.03* -0.33 0.03 -0.17 
mil exp/gdp 0.87* 0.22 -0.07 -0.18 
oil/absor 0.72* 0.29 -0.03 0.31 
oil/gdp 0.54* 0.47 0.09 0.35 
gov civil exp/gdp -0.02 0.96* O.Q7 -0.11 
gov civil exp/abs 0.10 0.87* -0.16 -0.20 
imports/gdp -0.07 0.18 0.95* -0.04 
import/abs -0.07 -0.06 0.95* 0.00 
size -0.27 0.42 -0.58 -0.02 
distrib/gdp -0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.94* 
distrib/abs -0.03 -0.35 -0.21 0.83 
(factor scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Oil/Mil Government Imports Distribution 
Expenditure Civil/Exp 
GCC States Structural Dimension 
UAE 1.02 -0.94 0.18 1.49 
Bahrain -0.80 -0.42 1.22 1.58 
Saudi Arabia 0.35 1.91 0.13 -0.79 
Oman 1.48 0.47 0.42 1.09 
Qatar 2.39 0.50 -0.57 -0.04 
Kuwait 0.13 1.93 1.11 0.38 
Notes: Four factor analysis, oblique rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Income Accounts of 
the Arab Countries (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, 1978). gdp = non-oil Gross Domestic Product; 
absor = absorption (total consumption plus investment) 
Finally by 1985 (Table 9): (1) Military expenditures had replaced civilian expend-
itures as the dimension most highly correlated with developments in the oil sector. (2) 
Oman again had a relatively high ranking of this factor, most likely as a result of the 
high share of government resources allocated to the military. This is also evidenced by 
the country's relatively low factor score on the civilian expenditure dimension, Factor 
2. (3) During the oil boom, the country had been able to significantly expend its 
distributive trades to the extent that it ranked third, only to Bahrain and the UAE in 
terms of relative economic importance. 
A further understanding of the process of structural change can be gained from a 
similar factor analysis of Oman's sectoral change over the period following the initial 
oil price increases. Again using a sample of twenty Arab world countries, the four main 
non-oil sectors of the economy were depicted by their share in (a) non-oil GDP, and (b) 
absorption. 
Again the results (Table 10) show several interesting patterns: (1) At the beginning 
of this period, 1975, Oman had by far the lowest level of industrial diversification. Its 
construction and service sectors were relatively well developed, but as noted above the 
country's distributive system was underdeveloped at this time. (2) By 1980 the coun-
try's service and distributive activities had increased significantly, but manufacturing 
still lagged considerably behind the other GCC countries. (3) Finally, by 1985, the 
country had developed a fairly good balance between construction, services and dis-
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Table JO: Arab Gulf states: Structural evolution, 19'75 -85 (factor scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
Gulf Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1975 
UAE -1.14 2.00 1.88 -0.91 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.35 0.92 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.53 1.10 -0.21 0.60 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.85 0.13 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.84 -0.50 2.08 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1980 
UAE 0.22 2.06 1.47 -0.81 
Bahrain 2.87 -0.46 1.94 0.57 
Saudi Arabia 0.97 2.08 -0.96 0.24 
Qatar -1.43 0.20 1.27 0.11 
Oman -1.41 0.67 0.97 2.07 
Kuwait 0.18 -0.24 0.32 1.52 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1985 
UAE 1.37 1.23 1.34 -0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.96 0.59 
Saudi Arabia -1.16 1.60 -0.78 0.57 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.75 
Oman -1.53 0.39 1.11 0.23 
Kuwait -0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Notes: Factor analysis based on orthogonal rotation. Data from Ai-ab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of 
Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987) 
tributive activities, but the country was still by far the most underdeveloped in terms of 
industrial diversification. 
While the factor analysis points up Oman's failure to close the industrial gap between 
itself and the other GCC countries, a closer look at the country's accomplishments in 
this area presents a more optimistic picture. 
Development of the manufacturing sector 
The Omani manufacturing sector is one of the youngest and fastest growing in the Arab 
world, and as such is not yet covered in full statistical detail. At the beginning of Oman's 
First Five Year Plan in 1975, it is estimated that there were no more than ten manufactur-
ing ventures representing an investment of under OR0.5 million. 
By 1980, the number of establishments had increased to 410 units, representing an invest-
ment of OR28 million, and by 1985, the respective figures were around 3,500 and OR300 
million. During this period, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP is estima-
ted to have risen from OR2.1 million to OR92.3 million, or to around 3.03 percent of GDP. 
The 1980-85 Plan envisaged a large role for the Oman Development Bank. Since the 
establishment of the Oman Development Bank in 1979, and up until 1983, the number 
of loans to manufacturing totalled 110 worth OR24 million. Food processing, beverages 
and storage facilities accounted for 38 of the loans, construction materials for 30 loans, 
the chemical sector for 22 loans, paper ~d printing for 11 loans, metal products for 6, 
furniture for 2 and textiles for 1. Loans are granted interest free and are repayable over 
20 years with a grace period of five years. 
ORIENT 32(1991)2 225 
The Third Five ~ar Plan 
The Third Five Year Plan approved in January 1986 lays stress on the rapid rate of 
development and the consequent increase in revenue and expenditure:s (1) Expected 
total revenues for the Plan are estimated at OR8,656 million, as against OR6,947 million 
for the Second Five Year Plan and OR3,126 for the First Five Year Plan. (2) Fixed ex-
penditures including salaries are estimated at OR6,818 million compared to previous 
figures of OR5,138 million and OR2,348 million respectively. (3) Development expend-
iture is estimated at OR2,211 million compared to OR2,115 million for the Second Five· 
Year Plan and OR905 million in the First Plan. (4) Total expenditure for the Third Five 
Year Plan is estimated at OR9,250 million compared with figures of OR7,368 million 
and OR3,337 million for the Second and First Plans. (5) Net non-oil revenues for the 
Third Plan are estimated at ORl,200 million compared with previous figures of OR343 
million and OR265 million. (6) Net oil revenues are estimated at OR7,171 million 
against OR7,092 million for the Second Five Year Plan and OR3,861 million for the First 
Plan. 
Subsidies to the private sector are estimated at OR121 million. The development of 
light and intermediate industries is to receive priority treatment in the Third Five Year 
Plan, with special attention to be devoted to industries that ensure self-sufficiency, with 
emphasis on consumer goods and foodstuffs. 
The Third Plan also stresses more importance of the development of export-oriented 
products with the purpose of reducing dependence on oil. Here, the private sector is 
assumed to play a significant role in developing income generating projects, particularly 
in agriculture and fisheries and light industries. 
Government policies toward industry 
The Omani government has taken several measures to encourage local industrialization 
besides offering of concessionary loans. These include the building and provision of 
facilities at the Rusail industrial estate, exemption from customs duties on raw material 
and plant equipment, and the cover of a protectionist tariff of 25 percent, which forcer-
tain items, like cement, is even levied on GCC-originating goods. 
Foreign capital up to 65 percent is allowed and positively encouraged to a maximum 
of 49 percent of a project by the award of a five year tax holiday extendable to ten. 
The government has prepared detailed techno-economic feasibility studies and of-
fered them and industrial licences to potential investors in the following areas: steel 
structure fabrication, metal furniture, marble processing, electrical transformers, 
assembly of agricultural pumps, assembly of air conditioners, and blending of lubri-
cating oil. 
In addition, the private sector has of its own initiated projects to make automobile bat-
teries, biscuits, glass bottles, toilet soap and detergents, pre-fabricated houses, boilers 
and pressure vessels. The principle industries are two cement companies, the oil 
refinery, a lubricants plant, the flour mill, the copper refinery, a projected adjacent 
ferrochrome plant, and an aluminum extrusion factory. 
S Arab Industry Review 1987188, p. 114. 
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The government plans to offer interest free loans for the projects which would be im-
plemented as joint stock companies. In short, the government is interested in attracting 
small investors and seeing that they also reap the benefits of industrial development. Ex-
tra incentives are to be granted firms who set up industries outside the Capital Area. In 
order to encourage industries in other parts of the country the government has planned 
to set up industrial estates in Sur, Soshar, Raysut and Nizwa. 
Oman Development Bank 
Oman follows a policy of free enterprise and the private sector is encouraged through 
soft loans and participation by the Oman Development Bank in the companies' equity 
capital. 
The Oman Development Bank, in line with overall economic activity in the country 
continues to play a leading role in supporting private sector projects. The total number 
ofloans approved in 1985 was 33, including 3 under the Small Scale Enterprise Scheme. 
The total lending was ORS.2 million, as against a total capital investment of OR13 
million. 
The bank has continued to encourage projects to be located outside the Capital Area. 
It allocated finance to 18 such projects which are under various stages of implementa-
tion. These include beverages, explosives, printing and stationery, furniture, electric 
wires and cables, metal industries, textiles, steel fixtures and truck bodies. 
The Small Scale Enterprise Scheme has entered into operational stages. Under the 
scheme loan applications are being accepted for projects with an investment value ofup 
to ORl00,000. The bank continues to promote and assist projects; this includes project 
identification, pre-feasibility studies, industrial licence application, commercial 
registration, advice on machinery selection, advice on raw materials and project im-
plementation. 
The bank has now financed 83 projects since it started its operations in 1979. Finance 
provided amounts to OR38,577,000, out of which OR37,643 was for loans and OR934 
was for equity participation. 
Problems facing Omani industry 
Omani industrialists have long been complaining about the high cost of port handling 
fees, electricity, gas, petroleum products, telephone and telex changes, which they say 
place financial stress on a developing industry. Another complaint by Omani 
businessmen relates to the high rate of interest charged by the banks, which they main-
tain adds to their costs and leaves them no alternative but to raise the price of their local 
product. For example, Omani businessmen say the interest charged by the Oman 
Development Bank is 8 percent for industrial projects in the capital and 5 percent in the 
interior. 
Local businessmen are also demanding protection against foreign goods by having 
duties levied on them and increasing the existing tariff barriers. They demand easing the 
restrictions on employing foreign experts and specialized technicians whom, they claim 
are essential for a developing industry. 
In responding to these concerns, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry placed 
severe restrictions on cement imports in December 1985. According to these restric-
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tions, no importer may bring cement into Oman without the express prior approval of the 
Ministry. The curb on imports of cement was placed to protect the national product after 
reports of fierce competition in the market from foreign brands, especially from the 
manufacturers in the neighboring UAE, who were dumping cement in Oman cheaper than 
the local plants despite a 20 percent import duty. 
Outlook 
The manufacturing sector contributed ORIS.6 million to the country's GDP in 1980. The 
value added by 1984 had risen to OR91.2 million, a growth rate of 484.6 percent, the highest 
among all the other sectors. With the completion of many vital infrastructure projects like 
the oil refinery, the expansion of the natural gas plant, Rusail industrial estate and two ce-
ment companies, Oman is now ready to take bigger strides in the industrialization process. 
The oil refinery at Mina Al Fahal with its full production capacity of 50,000 barrels a day 
has enabled Oman to be self-sufficient in refined oil products. The Rusail industrial estate 
which can house 123 factory plots, already has 79 plots completed and the second phase is 
underway. Similar estates will be established in Nizwa, Soshar and Salalah. The 
government-owned Oman Cement Company and the privately owned Raysut Cement 
Company in the south of the country together produce 840,000 tons of cement a year, 70 
percent of Oman's demand for the commodity. 6 
Besides providing facilities like the Rusail industrial estate, the government offers further 
support to the industrial sector in general and the private sector in particular. It has engaged 
an international consulting firm to carry out an industrial survey and identified viable pro-
jects. It provides tax exemptions to all Omani industrial units and has allocated OR109 
million in the Second Five Year Plan to soft loans to private sector enterprises. 
Factors affecting the gro-.vth of manufacturing 
The previous sections gave some. indication of the gains made to date and the factors 
responsible for these accomplishments. However, there remains the question of identifying 
which key factors may have tended to suppress the growth in manufacturing. 
As noted above, Oman has devoted a relatively large share of its resources to defense, 
even by GCC standards. There is a good chance these allocations may have diverted 
resources from manufacturing. This, therefore, seems a logical place to begin. 
Competition with defense expenditures 
To obtain insights into possible competition between defense spending and industrialization 
efforts, the sectoral factor analysis (Table 10) was extended to include measures of: (a) 
defense expenditures, (b) non-defense federal expenditures, and (c) absorption (total con-
sumption plus investment). 7 The public expenditure variables were depicted both as its 
share of: (a) non-oil GDP and (b) total absorption. The absorption variable was introduced 
as a share of: (a) non-oil GDP and (b) total GDP. 
6 Arab Industry Review 1987 / 88, p. 119. 
7 Ideally, it would be interesting to examine the impact of private sector expenditures, however, these figures are not available 
for the Arab states as a whole. The absorption figures do, of course, comprise a large private sector component for most of the 
sample countries. 
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Table 11: Oman: Factors affecting relative industrial performance - expenditure effects, 1'775 ifactor scores) 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
GCC Economies Factor Scores: Sectoral Dimension 
UAE -1.15 2.00 1.88 -0.90 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.35 0.91 -0.01 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.53 1.10 -0.21 0.59 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.84 0.13 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.83 -0.50 2.08 
GCC Economies Impact of Government Civilian Expenditures 
UAE -1.02(+) 2.12(+) 1.64( - ) -1.13(-) 
Bahrain 2.71(=) -0.65( - ) 1.06(+) 0.69(+) 
Saudi Arabi 0.95(=) 0.91( - ) -1.05(=) 0.88(+) 
Oman -1.43(=) 1.48( +) -0.57( - ) 0.38( - ) 
Qatar -0.02( - ) 1.11(-) 1.87(=) 0.52(+) 
Kuwait na na na na 
GCC Economies Impact of Military Expenditures 
UAE -0.99(+) 1.94(=) 2.00( +) -1.05( - ) 
Bahrain 2.75(=) -0.21( +) 0.81( - ) 0.14(+) 
Saudi Arabia 0.87(=) 1.02(=) -1.00(=) 0.69(=) 
Oman -1.56(=) 0.87(=) 0.03(+) 0.45( - ) 
Qatar 0.31(=) 2.04(+) 1.67( - ) 0.17(=) 
Kuwait -0.01(=) -0.98( - ) -0.38( +) 2.02(=) 
GCC Economies Impact of Absorption 
UAE -1.30( - ) 1.82( - ) 1.92(=) -0.90(=) 
Bahrain 2.71(=) 0.01(+) 0.77( - ) 0.04(=) 
Saudi Arabia 0.89(=) 1.42( +) -1.00( =) 0.66(=) 
Oman -1.56(=) 0.92( - ) -0.11(+) 0.58(=) 
Qatar 0.19(=) 1.88(=) 1.84(=) 0.18( =) 
Kuwait 0.26(+) -0.22( +) -0.74(-) 1.99(=) 
Note: ( ) = movement in ranking relative to sector dimension 
In each case the country factor scores obtained with public expenditures and absorption 
were compared with those derived when these variables were omitted. The year, 1981, 
was used in place of 1980, since this date represents the peak of the oil revenue boom, 
and is of particular interest for comparative purposes. The results (Tables 11, 12, and 
13): (1) The individual factor analysis (not shown here) containing a one-by-one in-
troduction of government expenditures and absorption, indicated that each of the ex-
penditure variables was positively correlated on the manufacturing factor, although this 
correlation was not sufficiently large so as to combine both sets of variables into one 
common factor. In general, the standardized correlation coefficients of expenditure on 
the industrial factor were in the 0.20-0.35 range. (2) In 1975 (Table 11), the country's 
heavy defense burden does not seem to have been a major factor retarding industrial 
diversification efforts. On the other hand the government's civilian expenditures appear 
to have provided a mild stimulus to industry (increasing its factor score from -1.53 to 
-1.43). In other words, given the level of government civilian expenditures, Oman had 
increased its relative industrial ranking. (3) As might have been anticipated, the greatest 
impact of government expenditure was on the construction sector, with the service sec-
tor (and to a lesser extent the distribution sector) also positively affected. (4) In general, 
total expenditures (absorption) had less of an impact on sectoral structures than either 
type of government expenditures. In Oman's case the effect on industry was neutral. 
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Table 12: Oman: Factors affecting relative industrial performance - expenditure effects, 1981 (factor scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
ace Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1981 
UAE 0.59 1.22 1.26 -0.58 
Bahrain 2.32 -0.31 2.26 0.72 
Saudi Arabia 0.24 2.<J7 -0.97 0.21 
Oman -1.67 0.24 1.34 0.36 
Qatar 0.50 0.37 0.89 1.64 
Kuwait --0.02 --0.33 0.56 1.36 
ace Economies Impact of Absorption 
UAR 0.59(=) 1.23(=) 1.29(=) --0.45( +) 
Bahrain 2.31(=) --0.33(=) 2.15(+) 0.71(=) 
Saudi Arabia 0.19(=) 2.17( +) -0.57( +) 0.45(+) 
Oman -1.69(=) 0.27(=) 1.26(=) 0.35(=) 
Qatar 0.43(=) 0.48( +) 1.09( +) 1.72(=) 
Kuwait -0.05(=) -0.23( +) 0.70(+) 1.40(=) 
ace Economies Impact of Government Civilian Expenditures 
UAE 0.48( - ) 1.33( +) 1.17(=) -0.44(+) 
Bahrain 2.20( - ) --0.19(+) 2.17(=) 0.89(+) 
Saudi Arabia 0.13( - ) 2.15(=) -1.02(=) 0.27(=) 
Oman -1.68(=) 0.34(=) 1.24(=) 0.49( +) 
Qater na na na na 
Kuwait -0.08(=) --0.29(=) 0.49(=) 1.42(=) 
ace Economies Impact of Military Expenditures 
UAE 0.61(=) 1.43( +) 1.18(=) -0.45( +) 
Bahrain 2.12( - ) 0.10(+) 2.41( +) 0.97(+) 
Saudi Arabia 0.31(=) 2.27(+) -1.00(=) 0.36(+) 
Oman -1.69(=) 0.19(=) 1.10( - ) 0.49(+) 
Qatar na na na na 
Kuwait -0.02(=) -0.28(=) 0.50(=) 1.55( +) 
Notes: ( ) = movement in ranking relative to sector dimension 
By 1981 the situation had changed to the extent that (Table 12): (1) There was an in-
creasingly positive impact of military expenditures (and to a lesser extent non-defense 
expenditures) on the relative expansion ofGCC service sectors. (2) Generally speaking, 
military expenditures were somewhat neutral with respect to industrial development, 
whereas non-defense expenditures tended to impact to such an extent on non-industrial 
activity as to reduce the relative share of this activity in the GCC states. In 1981, Oman 
followed the standard pattern in this regard. (3) Overall expenditures or absorption tend-
ed to have their greatest impact on the relative development of the distributive trade sec-
tors, while remaining neutral with regard to industrial development. Since this expend-
iture term has a large private sector component, it appears that private expenditures have 
not played a leading role in GCC industrial development. Instead, these expenditures 
have facilitated the relative expansion of construction/ distribution, followed by the ser-
vice sectors. (4) In sum, at the peak of the oil boom, the GCC countries' structures were 
largely molded by the level and pattern of government expenditures. Private sector ex-
penditures played a smaller role in marginally expanding the non-industrial shares of 
non-oil GDP /total absorption. 
Finally by 1985 (Table 13): (1) Defense and expenditures in Oman were such as to 
reduce the relative share of industrial output. Several other countries, the UAE and 
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Table 13: Oman: Factors affecting relative industrial performance - expenditure effects, 1985 (factor scores) 
Factor l Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1985 
UAE 1.37 1.23 1.34 -0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.96 0.59 
Saudi Arabia -0.16 1.60 -0.78 0.57 
Oman -1.53 0.39 1.11 0.23 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.75 
Kuwait -0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Oil Economies Impact of Absorption 
UAE 1.35(=) 1.28( =) 1.49( - ) 0.26(+) 
Bahrain 0.86(=) 0.37(=) 1.79( +) 0.53(=) 
Saudi Arabia -0.12(=) 1.58(=) -0.79(=) 0.47( - ) 
Oman -1.56(=) 0.44(=) 1.12( - ) 0.32(=) 
Qatar 0.72(=) 0.30(=) 0.32(=) 2.78(=) 
Kuwait -0.38(=) -0.84( - ) -0.27(=) 0.87( - ) 
Oil Economies Impact of Government Civilian Expenditures 
UAE 1.17( - ) 1.25(=) 1.20( - ) 0.02(=) 
Bahrain 0.63( - ) 0.46(=) 1.69( - ) 0.78(+) 
Saudi Arabia -0.23(=) 1.58(=) -0.75(=) 0.01( - ) 
Oman -1.62(=) 0.37(=) 1.10(=) -0.10( - ) 
Qatar 0.45( - ) 0.41( +) -0.20( - ) 2.87(+) 
Kuwait -0.44(=) -0.98( - ) 0.01( +) 0.13( - ) 
GCC Economies Impact of Military Expenditures 
UAE 1.14( - ) 1.30(=) 1.23( - ) 0.10(+) 
Bahrain 0.90(=) 0.39(=) 1.83(=) 0.79(+) 
Saudi Arabia -0.38( - ) 1.73(+) -0.80(=) 0.78(+) 
Oman -1.67( - ) 0.49( +) 1.03(=) 0.31( +) 
Qatar 0.76(=) 0.32(=) 0.02( - ) 3.01( +) 
Kuwait -0.42(=) -0.92(=) -0.13(=) 1.04(+) 
Note: ( ) movement in ranking relative to sector dimension 
Saudi Arabia who also allocated a large proportion of their resources to the military ex-
perienced this phenomenon. (2) As in 1981, the private sector was not able to offset the 
government expenditure effect, and as a result had a relatively neutral impact on in-
dustrial diversification in Oman in particular and the GCC in general. (3) While govern-
ment non-defense expenditures were less influential in affecting the shares of non-
industrial output, military expenditures tended to have a major impact on services (and 
to a lesser extent distributional activities). 
Certainly by 1985, Oman's defense expenditures were taking something of a toll on the 
country's industrial development, as falling oil revenues combined with high defense ex-
penditures created a number of strains on the economy. One resource, industrial man-
power, may have been particularly scarce. 
In 1985, Oman's labor force was estimated at around 440,000, only 31 percent of 
whom were Omanis. Of the more than 314,000 immigrants working in Oman, almost 90 
percent were from the Indian sub-continent. Most of the migrants work in the modem 
private sectors. As of 1980 around 62 percent of active Omani nationals worked in the 
rural and traditional sectors. Most Omanis outside the traditional sector work for the 
government: by 1985, 25 percent of the total national workforce (including almost all ac-
tive women) were employed in the public sector. This was more than the number in 
agriculture, which had shrunk to about 15 percent. 
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As a consequence of the oil price collapse in 1986, there has been a big reduction in 
government and oil company contracts and a consequent exodus from Oman of many 
Asian workers and Western businessmen. However, since the official immigration 
figures are thought to be understated perhaps by as much as 100,000, 8 the exodus may not 
be revealed immediately in the statistics. The government stated in 1987 that 50,000 
foreign laborers had left the country in 1986, and that another 50,000 would go in 1987. 
Competition from imports 
As noted above, Oman has historically been a relatively large importer, even by GCC 
standards. Yet, foreign competition is becoming one of the major concerns of Omani 
businessmen. Have imports ceased to stimulate industry and in fact now creating 
disincentives to invest in manufacturing activities? 
In order to examine this issue, several factor analyses similar to those presented above 
were performed. Beginning with the basis sectoral patterns found in Tuble 10, imports 
Table 14: Arab world: Affect ofimpons on relative industrialiwtion, 1975 (standardized regression coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distribut Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
manufact/absor 0.98* -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 
manufact/gdp 0.86* 0.17 -0.04 0.14 
Imports 0.80* 0.40 0.01 0.01 
construct/ gdp -0.04 1.00* -0.06 0.03 
construct/ abs 0.10 0.93* 0.10 -0.05 
distribut/ gdp -0.21 0.14 0.91* 0.18 
distrib/ absor 0.23 -0.07 0.86* -0.21 
services/ gdp -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.98* 
services/absor 0.49 -0.07 0.11 0.63* 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distribut Services 
Gulf Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1975 
UAE -1.14 2.00 1.88 -0.91 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.35 0.92 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.53 1.10 -0.21 0.60 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.85 0.13 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.84 -0.50 2.08 
Oil Economies Import Effects - 1975 
UAE -0.88( +) 2.11(+) 1.75( - ) -1.04( - ) 
Bahrain 3.27(+) -0.24(+) 1.01(=) 0.26(+) 
Saudi Arabia 0.82(=) 0.82( - ) -0.99(=) 0.69(=) 
Oman -1.06(+) 1.49( +) -0.41( - ) 0.25( - ) 
Qatar 0.02( - ) 1.46( - ) 1.95( +) 0.37(+) 
Kuwait -0.08( - ) -0.75(=) -0.62( - ) 1.99(=) 
Notes: Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab 
Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). Oil =the ratio of the oil sector's value 
added to total non-oil GDP 
8 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Arabian Peninsula: Economic Structure and Analysis (London: EIU, 1988), p. 79. 
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Table 15: Arab world: Affect of imports on relative industrialization, 1981 (standardized regression coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distribut Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
manufact/gdp 1.00* --0.18 --0.09 0.01 
manufactlabsor 0.97* --0.03 0.06 0.01 
construct/ gdp --0.04 0.99* --0.02 O.Q2 
construct/abs 0.18 0.97* 0.07 --0.02 
distribut/ gdp --0.19 0.18 0.98* 0.00 
distributl abs 0.24 --0.16 0.84* --0.10 
hnports 0.11 0.01 0.50* 0.42 
services/ gdp -0.17 0.14 --0.06 1.00* 
services/absor 0.29 --0.18 --0.03 0.81* 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distribut Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension - 1981 
UAE 0.60 1.21 1.26 --0.58 
Bahrain 2.32 --0.32 2.26 0.72 
Saudi Arabia 0.24 2.07 --0.97 0.21 
Qatar 0.50 0.25 1.34 0.36 
Oman -1.67 0.37 0.89 1.64 
Kuwait --0.02 -0.33 0.56 1.36 
Oil Economies hnport Effects - 1981 
UAE 0.57(=) 1.22(=) 1.17(=) --0.62(=) 
Bahrain 2.39(=) -0.32(=) 2.70(+) 1.11( +) 
Saudi Arabia 0.25(=) 2.07(=) --0.86( +) 0.29(+) 
Oman -1.67(=) 0.25(=) 1.22( - ) 0.27(+) 
Qatar 0.46(=) 0.38(=) 0.59( - ) 1.34( - ) 
Kuwait --0.03(=) --0.34(=) 0.52(=) 1.29(=) 
Notes: Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab 
Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). Oil= the ratio of the oil sector's value 
added to total non-oil GDP 
were introduced to the factor analysis. The difference in factor scores between the base 
index and the results obtained after inserting imports provides an indication of t;he im-
pact imports have had on the country's industrial diversification efforts. 
Again using a three period analysis the results (Tubles 14, 15 and 16) show several 
distinct changes taking place over time: (1) At the beginning of the period, 1975 imports 
tended to be highly and positively correlated with industrial diversification (Tuble 14). At 
this time Oman's factor score on manufacturing increased considerably with the imports 
included in the analysis. (2) By 1981, the height of the oil boom, imports were only slight-
ly correlated with industrial diversification in the Arab world. Their effect on Oman's in-
dustrial development was neutral (Tuble 15). (3) Finally by 1985 (Table 16) imports had 
a negative correlation on the region's industrial diversification. Given Oman's high import 
component, the effect was particularly serious for that country's industrialists. 
Clearly, increasing foreign competition is becoming a major problem for Omani 
firms. They have, however, received some help from other GCC states in amendments 
to the Unified Economic Agreement of 1981. The UEA's first three articles provide for 
the waiving of customs duties on trade among the GCC states themselves. For product 
to qualify as nationally manufactured and become eligible for exemption, its domestic 
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'Table 16: Arab world: Affect ofimpons on relative industrialkation, 1985 (standardized regression coefficients) 
Factor l Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distribut Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
manufact/ absor 0.98* --0.11 0.12 0,02 
manufact/gdp 0.85* --0.09 0.12 0.15 
construct/ gdp --0.21 0.99* 0,07 om 
construct/ abs 0.03 0.97* 0.09 0.01 
distribut/ gdp 0.00 0.11 0.95* 0.04 
distribut/ abs 0.38 0.06 0.81* --0.16 
services/ gdp 0.16 0.17 --0.14 0.84* 
services/absor 0.44 0.13 --0.13 0.68* 
Imports --0.38 --0.25 0.40 0.65* 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor l Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distribut Servi es 
Oil Economies Sectorial Dimension - 1985 
UAE 1.37 1.23 1.34 --0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.% 0.59 
Saudi Arabia --0.16 1.60 --0.78 0.57 
Oman -1.53 0.39 1.11 0.23 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.75 
Kuwait --0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Oil Economies Import Effects - 1985 
UAE l.14( - ) l.10( - ) 1.33(=) --0.06( =) 
Bahrain 0.42( - ) 0.11(-) 2.25( +) l.19( +) 
Saudi Arabia --0.22( - ) 1.44( - ) --0.67( +) 0.76( +) 
Oman -1.28( +) ' 0.39(=) 1.06(=) 0.30(=) 
Qatar l.40(+) 0.74(+) --0.53( - ) 1.%( - ) 
Kuwait --0.42(=) --0.87(=) --0.15( =) l.32( +) 
Notes: Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab 
Countries, 1974-85(Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). Distribution= the share of distributive 
activities in total absorption 
value added must constitute.at least 40 percent of the cost of the finish end product and 
GCC nationals must own at least 51 percent of the equity of the firm producing it. 
Yet Oman is seen as a special case, having embarked on its development effort later 
than its neighbors. The UEA said that consideration will be given to differences in levels 
of development and that member states may be temporarily exempted from applying 
certain provisions. As a result: (1) When tariff barriers between Gulf states came down 
in 1983, Oman was allowed to go on imposing tariffs on imports of certain products, in-
cluding cement, aluminum products and plastics. (2) Oman raised the duty on cement 
imports from 20 to 50 percent in the spring of 1987 to protect local producers from alleg-
ed dumping, thereby causing great concern among cement producers in the UAE. These 
exemptions were to have expired in March 1988, but were extended for a further five 
years. 9 (3) Oman has made it clear that it has no intention of removing tariffs until 
other states reduce their subsidies. 
Whether or not Omani industrialists will be able to receive higher tariff protection in 
the future is difficult to predict. It appears, however, that the country is suffering to a 
9 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Arabian Peninsula: Economic Structure and Analysis (London: EIU, 1988), p. 23. 
234 ORIENT 32(1991)2 
large extent from being among the less developed GCC countries and therefore 
somewhat unprepared to compete on an equal footing. Perhaps as a result of this con-
cern, Omani imports from other GCC countries have been falling in relative terms over 
the last few years. 
Conclusions 
From the start, Omani development proceeded at a rapid pace, but was well planned. By 
comparison with some of its neighbors, Oman's oil resources were modest. It therefore 
avoided prestige projects and concentrated on the building of sound infrastructure, and 
on education and health. By good fortune the financing of development was greatly aid-
ed by the steep increases in world oil prices in the 1970s. 
As Oman began oil production and general development quite recently, the country 
will be heavily dependent on current oil revenues for most of the rest of this century. Ex-
ternal asset accumulation has only been proceeding for a few years while the economic 
base of the country and the shortages of sufficiently skilled Omanis make substantial im-
ports of goods and labor unavoidable. Fortunately considerable potential remains for 
finding new and viable oil and gas fields and the relative ease with which Oman finds 
customers for its oil suggests that the development process will pick up pace again once 
oil prices and revenues recover. 10 
The large potential still t;xisting for import substitution in some basic manufacturing 
industries and in services, combined with the government promotion of the private sec-
tor, suggests that continuing rational projects selection will lay the basis for a permanent 
and prosperous domestic economic base. 
Whereas other Gulf countries are constrained by labor resource limitations, Oman's 
relatively large indigenous population and the quality of education now being offered to 
the majority of those of school age suggest that considerable expansion of the non-oil 
economy may be possible during the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans. 
The main threat to such as expansion would appear to lie in the excessive military 
development plans of the Sultanate, and the possibility that competition for resources 
might create an inflationary environment not conducive to domestic production. In 
general, however, the Omani administration is credited with the necessary control and 
conservatism to avoid damaging the solid base it has built for the future. 
10 The Arab Economies: Structure and Outlook (Manama, Bahrain: Arab Banking Corporation, October 1986, second edi-
tion), pp. 119-120. 
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